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THE ACTUAL OPERATION OF AMENDED
RULE 11
REMARKS OFA. SIMON CHREIN*
In discussing the actual operation of the Rule, I think it wise to divide
my presentation into three parts. First I will deal very briefly with my
own experiences with pleadings and with my magistrate's eye view of
lawsuits and their quality and merit. I will then deal with statistics that
were generated by the Second Circuit Committee on the Pretrial Phase of
Civil Cases6 3 as well as by Professor Vairo 6 of Fordham which will tend
to reflect trends and the application of the rule. I will then deal very
briefly with the types of cases in which sanctions are almost often
imposed.
A magistrate of course has very little opportunity to impose sanctions
for frivolous pleadings. Those matters are resolved at a higher level.6 5
However, the magistrates in the Eastern District do have considerable
exposure to lawsuits during their pretrial phase and do have an opportunity either in settlement discussions or in scheduling conferences to discuss the pleadings with counsel. Thus, we are able to gauge whether or
not the amendments to Rule 11 have had the in terrorem effect that the
Advisory Committee Notes suggest that they should have." Since the
adoption of the amendments,6 7 I have seen a number of cases in which a
strict application of the Rule might very well mandate sanctions. I do
not include in my discussion cases drawn by pro se litigants." Though
there is case law sanctioning pro se litigants, I don't feel it is applicable
here because we are dealing essentially with the Rule 11 requirement that
an attorney certify pleadings and I would like to focus on Rule 11 violations as they affect the work product of attorneys.
In initial scheduling conferences I very often find suggestions that
attorneys have brought cases, the merits of which they are not certain,
* Magistrate, United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
63. Memorandum from Timothy Cone to Standish Forde Medina, A Supplemental
Analysis of Reported DecisionsApplying the 1983 Amendments to Rules 11, 16 and26 of
the FederalRules of Civil Procedure (Feb. 22, 1985) (available in the files of the Fordham

Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Second Circuit Committee Report].
64. In his remarks, Magistrate Chrein relied on unpublished statistics provided to
him by Professor Georgene M. Vairo of Fordham Law School These statistics have
since been updated and published. See Vairo, supra note 1, at 55.
65. See, e.g., Rubin v. Buckman, 727 F.2d 71, 73 (3d Cir. 1984) (court of appeals
remanding to district court to consider whether sanctions should be imposed); Heimbaugh v. City of San Francisco, 591 F. Supp. 1573, 1577 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (district court

imposing costs).
66. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory comm. note.
67. The amendments became effective on August 1, 1983. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
68. See, e.g., Day v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (S.D. Tex.),
appeal dismissed mem., 747 F.2d 1462 (5th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1849

(1985); Heimbaugh v. City of San Francisco, 591 F. Supp. 1573, 1577 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
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only to avoid the effects of a soon maturing statute of limitations. This
often surfaces in product liability cases and in personal injury cases
where an attorney will tell me, in the presence of opposing counselwhen asked to answer a simple interrogatory explaining his theory of
liability or to indicate whether or not he will have an expert who will
establish a certain point which would be an essential ingredient of his
case-that this particular occurrence or accident could not have happened but for some legal fault. "So therefore I assume there was legal
fault." A strict application of the rule might very well mandate the
award of sanctions in that case. Presumably the attorney sophisticated
and knowledgeable of the rules would not have signed the pleading on
the basis of research as skimpy as this.
Candid statements are made in settlement conferences which of course
I take with an assurance of confidentiality which very often goes further.
That, "Well, my client was injured and it looked like a fairly large target
of opportunity so I brought the lawsuit." Unfortunately or fortunately,
depending on your perspective, I can do nothing about that because representations made to me during settlement conferences are made with the
understanding that they are given to me in confidence and I do not feel it
appropriate to breach those confidences.6 9 But again, you might even
argue that such representations may not be violations of the rule.
In Friedgood v. Axelrod,7 ° a prisoner brought a lawsuit claiming that
he was exposed to asbestos during his work in the prison.7 ' Opposing
counsel, representing the attorney general of the State of New York, advised counsel who was appearing for that prisoner that there was conclusive evidence and conclusive factual data to disclose that this prisoner
could never have gone within striking distance of an asbestos hazard.72
When the attorney persisted in the lawsuit an application was made for
sanctions.7 3 The application was denied by the district judge on the
grounds that the attorney might not have had, under the pressure of
time, sufficient opportunity to familiarize himself with the case.7 4 He
was not bound to rely on the representations of opposing counsel even if
they were buttressed by convincing and objective data.7" An attorney's
persisting with a suit that might have a weak factual premise is justified if
the attorney, again though this is a case brought since the passage of the
amendments, if the attorney subjectively could have felt that he might
69. Cf United States v. Cianfrani, 448 F. Supp. 1102, 1107-08 (E.D. Pa.) (enumerat-

ing pretrial procedures not open to public), rev'd on other grounds, 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir.
1978).
70. 593 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).

71. Id at 396.
72. Id at 396-97.
73. Id at 397.
74. The defendants' attorney did not show the plaintif's attorney photographs and
blueprints that cast doubt on the representations of his client until the afternoon before
the evidentiary hearing). See 593 F. Supp. at 397.

75. See id. at 398.
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have proof of those facts.7 6
I have seen a number of cases filed claiming diversity jurisdiction in
which the pleadings themselves indicate that both parties are citizens of
the same state. The case had to be fitered through the clerk's office. It
had to be filtered through a magistrate. It had to be assigned to a judge.
But I have never seen sanctions imposed in such cases. I have seen cases
where a very brief exploration of the facts would demonstrate without
any ambiguity that there is no jurisdictional basis for the case in a federal
court but no sanctions have been imposed. More frequently, I have seen
knee-jerk affirmative defenses that seem to suggest quite strongly that an
attorney has taken out a form book and indicated that the statute of
limitations has run or that service has not been properly effected. I have
never seen sanctions imposed in those cases.
Now, you may say, "Well, you are imagining, you are a magistrate and
you don't dismiss cases, you don't strike pleadings. Of course you don't
see the imposition of sanctions." But I do follow these cases and I am
aware of motions to dismiss. I am aware of motions to strike pleadings
and that sanctions are seldom imposed. Sometimes in conversation with
counsel I suggest that the pleadings may be overly ambitious, suggestive
of a possible excess sanctionable under Rule 11. I have yet to see a lawyer who has indicated to me that he would press for the imposition of
sanctions. I have seen lawyers frequently take the position that they will
move for a dismissal or to strike defenses.
The lawyers seem to be reluctant to press for the imposition of sanctions and I have the sense, and this is my own visceral sense, that today's
beneficiary of a Rule 11 sanction might find himself in the dock tomorrow and he might hesithte to press his luck in that area.' I also have
the sense that lawyers are pragmatic and they hope that sooner or later
the case can be settled and that filing for sanctions against the opposing
counsel would certainly poison the well of settlement. I also suspect that
lawyers might, as indicated by Mr. Cannon, have the sense that, "What
is the use? We can apply for sanctions and it might generate more expense in satellite litigation but it will produce very little benefit.""
The Advisory Committee Note indicates that the mandatory language
in the Rule 11 revisions should remove inhibitions on judges in awarding
sanctions.7 9 The transmittal letter from the Chairman of the Advisory
Committee indicates that even with the risk of satellite litigation, sanctions may be justified if they tend to deter meritless pleadings . ' The
statistics that have been made available to me and the cases that I have
76. See id
77. See Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New FederalRule 11-A Closer Look, 104
F.R.D. 181, 183 (1985) ("Lawyers may not want to inhibit their own freedom by calling
their opponents' practices into question.").
78. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text (Remarks of John F. Cannon).

79. See Fed. IL Civ. P. 11 advisory comm. note.
80. See Manfield Letter, supra note 3, at 191-92.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

read suggested very strongly that there is presently a trend towards the
accelerated use of sanctions, but that sanctions are awarded in a minority
of cases.8" Perhaps a growing minority of cases, but a minority of cases.
I would state as a caution that it is difficult to make an accurate statistical survey in this area as sanction applications and orders, I would assume, in the main go unrecorded. 82 In the few cases that address the
question of sanctions, those sanctions are not central to the case. They
appear as a tag along to a decision otherwise disposing of the case on the
merits.8 3 I would assume that sanction opinions are not written unless
the author judge feels that they would provide some useful precedent.
The type of situation that gives rise to an application to sanction a lawyer
might very well be a case which the district judge feels will provide very
little useful precedent. There might be an inhibition to address sanctions
at length because of a judge's sense that he would rather not unduly embarrass counsel through mentioning him in his opinion as the author of a
meritless pleading.8 4 I would also note in passing that a monetary sanction imposed against an attorney can always be rescinded by a higher
court.8 5 But unflattering language about a lawyer somehow will stick if it
appears in an opinion and judges might hesitate even to reprimand the
lawyer in an opinion for going overboard in pleadings that would be meritless under Rule 11.
A compendium of reported cases and opinions that appear in Lexis
and Westlaw was prepared for the Second Circuit Committee on the Pretrial Phase of Civil Cases. Their statistics indicate the frequency and use
of sanctions from the amendments to the rule in August, 1983 until January 30, 1985.86 That compendium reflects that 132 cases, and bear in
mind these statistics end as of January 30, 1985, of those 132 cases there
were fifty-two grants of sanctions.8 7 Of those fifty-two grants of sanctions, twenty of those cases were in the Northern District of Illinois, the
Southern District of New York and the Eastern District of New York.88
Professor Vairo's statistics indicate that the Southern District and the
Eastern District of New York account for 20% of the awards of Rule 11
sanctions nationally. 9 The Northern District of Illinois accounts for
10%90 and the two metropolitan districts in California, the Northern
District and the Central District of that state, account for 10% of sanc81. See Second Circuit Committee Report, supra note 63, app. A, at 4-5.
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., Rubin v. Buckman, 727 F.2d 71, 73 (3d Cir. 1984); Badillo v. Central
Steel & Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1166-67 (7th Cir. 1983); Heimbaugh v. City of San
Francisco, 591 F. Supp. 1573, 1577 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
84. See Schwartzer, supra note 77, at 202.
85. See Philips Business Sys. v. Executive Communications Sys., 744 F.2d 287, 29192 (2d Cir. 1984).
86. See Second Circuit Committee Report, supra note 63, at 1.
87. See id app. E.
88. See id
89. Vairo, supra note 1, at 74.
90. Id
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tions9 1 I would suggest that this concentration of sanction cases can be
accounted for by the fact that these are busy metropolitan districts.
These courts might feel th6 press of a burgeoning caseload and therefore
might be more ready to react to what they perceive as an abuse of the
court system by attorneys. 92
If you are concerned with whether plaintiffs or defendants are the
more convenient targets for the award of sanctions, the figures that were
generated for the Second Circuit Committee indicate that of 106 applications for sanctions against plaintiffs, forty-seven were granted, forty-four
were denied and there were fifteen warnings. 9 3 Of the thirty-three applications against defendents, seventeen were granted, ten were denied and
six resulted in warnings.' I have been given a list noting each of the
cases and I do notice, and Professor Vairo would tend to agree with my
sense, that there was an accelerated willingness to award sanctions.
At first there was a little trickle of water through the dike and apparently a brick or two has become dislodged, though I don't think anybody
has to worry seriously about drowning in a sea of sanctions.9" There was
also one fee award noted in the Committee's statistics for the frivolous
making of a motion for sanctions. Professor Vairo noticed, 96 and there
may be some reason to suspect that this does not necessarily represent
the trend, but there were eight cases which suggest that somebody was
trying to send a particular message in Indiana, in which taxpayers who
brought suit were punished. 97 These are clients punished for bringing
such a suit where the court perceived the suit as an effort to delay the
payment of taxes.98
If you are concerned about whether sanctions will be imposed against
attorneys, attorneys and clients, or the client alone, Professor Vairo's statistics indicate seventy-six cases in which it is possible to identify the
object of sanctions. Thirty-seven cases involve sanctions against the attorneys alone, three involve sanctions against the client alone, thirteen
involve sanctions against both. 99 I would suggest that a problem does
surface in connection with the question of whether or not sanctions are
appropriately awarded against attorneys or imposed against the client
91. Id

92. See id.
93. See Second Circuit Committee Report, supra note 63, app. D.
94. Id
95. Id
96. Vairo, supra note 1, at 119.
97. See Stelly v. Commissioner, 761 F.2d 1113, 1115-16 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 149 (1985); Johnson v. United States, 607 F. Supp. 347, 349-50 (E.D.
Pa. 1985); Miller v. United States, 604 F. Supp. 804, 805-06 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Eske v.
Hynes, 601 F. Supp. 142, 144 (E.D. Vis. 1985); McKinney v. Regan, 599 F. Supp. 126,
129-30 (LD. La. 1984); Snyder v. IRS, 596 F. Supp. 240, 252 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Young
v. IRS, 596 F. Supp. 141, 151-52 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Cameron v. IRS, 593 F. Supp. 1540,
1557-58 (N.D. Ind. 1984), affid, 773 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1985).
98. See supra note 97.
99. See Vairo, supra note 1, at 117-21.
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alone, though the Advisory Committee Note expresses the sentiment that
it is not the purpose of these amendments to in any way impinge on the
attorney-client privilege.100 I question whether or not an attorney, when
having to defend himself against the charge that he has certified to the
reasonable belief that the factual allegations in a pleading or a motion are
correct, that such an attorney might find it difficult to place the blame on
his client. Unlike the case of a collateral attack on a criminal conviction,
or a professional malpractice suit, here the attorney is still in league with
his client, there has been no waiver of the attorney-client privilege and it
could very well be that the attorney might have been told something by a
client that might have been disproved either in discovery or at trial, and
the attorney would be totally helpless to point the finger to his client and
say, "I am relying upon what I was told and I had a reasonable basis to
rely upon that." But that topic would be best reserved for another
discussion.
If you are concerned with the types of cases in which sanctions are
awarded, I have gone through the sanction cases that were provided me
and I have chosen examples of recurring patterns of sanction awards.
Sanctions will be more likely imposed in situations where a relatively
powerful party will use its economic leverage to oppress an economically
disadvantaged opponent. An illustrative citation would be Philips Business Systems v. Executive Business Systems,10 1 an Eastern District of New
York case. Another case, again I don't want to seem parochial, but coincidentally it is also from the Eastern District of New York, no doubt a
fount of all wisdom. Although Zimmerman v. Schweiker °2 might be
more appropriately chargeable to the Equal Access to Justice Act,10 3
many of the same concerns and considerations were included in the
court's reasoning that would surface in a Rule 11 case. Another way of
ensuring yourself punishment would be to deliberately misrepresent the
law. Sanctions were awarded against an attorney citing a dissent in a
Supreme Court decision clearly on point against him and that one, if you
are interested, is Fisher v. CPCInternational,Inc.14
Sanctions are often awarded in consideration of an attorney's experience-either in terms of the number of years admitted to practice or the
degree of specialization and expertise he presumably has-as being inconsistent with the type of pleading offered. One case would be Huettig
& Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape ContractorsCouncil10 5 and also Rubin v.
Long Island Lighting Co.10 6 I would also suggest a caution, and perhaps
it is an editorial comment, that if an attorney who the court feels should
100. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory comm. note.
101. 570 F. Supp. 1343, 1351 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), modified, 744 F.2d 287, 292 (2d Cir.
1984) (reversing fee award).
102. 575 F. Supp. 1436, 1441-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
103. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412 (Supp. 1985).
104. 591 F. Supp. 228, 236 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
105. 582 F. Supp. 1519, 1522 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
106. 576 F. Supp. 608, 615 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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know better is to be sanctioned for an ambitious pleading or perhaps for
an innovative pleading, we might run the hazard of discouraging growth
in the law and creativity on the part of counsel. Many principles that are
now well established in the law were the result of what could have very
well have been deemed thirty or forty years ago to be frivolous pleading.
I know the Advisory Committee does speak in terms of a disinclination
to punish innovative counsel. 0 7 But this is not my topic so I will hit it
and run. But there is a suggestion that if sanctions are awarded against a
lawyer who is presumably expert in his field for filing a pleading that is
deemed meritless by the judge analyzing that pleading then there is a
danger of perhaps denying access to the court to certain types of claims
that might ultimately, in an evolving climate, be shown to have great
merit.
Another area where sanctions have been repeatedly imposed is where a
party has persisted in bringing repeated harassing lawsuits against the
same target. This has often been the case in pro se litigant matters but
also in the case of counsel generated pleadings. Examples would be Taylor v. Prudential-BacheSecurities, Ina 018 and Tedeschi v. Smith Barney,
Harris Upham & Co. 9 Even if a pleading is deemed consistent with
existing law or reasonable at the inception of the lawsuit, sanctions have
occasionally been awarded where an attorney persists in a position after
discovery should have disclosed the want of virtue or the want of merit in
the particular position taken. An example of that would be Steinberg v.
St Regis/Sheraton Hotel,"10 and again I suppose the old law case of
Nemeroff v. Abelson."'
I guess one might say that like many other corrective measures Rule
11 seeks to address an abuse. The Rule as well as the cases and commentaries fortunately shows a deference to innovative lawyers and litigants
and shows respect for the attorney-client privilege. Hopefully, the Rule
will strike a balance between the need to curtail abuse of the courts and
the legal system and at the same time not stifle creativity and vitality in
the law.
107. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory comm. note.
108. 594 F. Supp. 226, 228 (N.D.N.Y.), appealdismissed mem., 751 F.2d 371 (2d Cir.

1984).
109. 579 F. Supp. 657, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), affd per curiam, 757 F.2d 465 (2d Cir.
1985).
110. 583 F. Supp. 421, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).

111. 704 F.2d 652, 659-60 (2d Cir. 1983).

